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Abstract
While “mega FTAs” and WTO–driven efforts at multilateral liberalisation dom-
inate the agenda, customs unions (CU) are the silent success story of regional
integration. Throughout the world, CUs have been superseding earlier FTAs, as
new unions were formed or old ones expanded. Due to problems of measurement,
this fact appears to have gone largely unnoticed so far. We show that the prolifer-
ation of CUs is driven by national social welfare considerations: even allowing for
lobbying, CUs lead to higher social welfare than any other bilateral trade agree-
ment. Thus, even the most ambitious mega FTAs eventually turn into “mega
CUs”.
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1. Introduction
Customs unions (CUs), regional trade agreements (RTAs) committing mem-
bers to zero internal tariffs and a common external tariff (CET), are the silent
success of regional integration in the past two decades1. Much of this success is by
superseding a complex web of earlier agreements in many regions of the world; due
to problems of measurement, discussed below, this story has so far been largely
overlooked. Since CUs have more protectionist tariff policies than FTAs when
tariffs are set endogenously (Ornelas, 2007), this has potentially profound welfare
consequences. However, until now, the issue has remained an “open question”
(Freund and Ornelas, 2010, p. 25). The present paper seeks to fill this void,
through a comprehensive social welfare and political economy analysis of trade
agreements that encompasses CUs.
Customs unions have rapidly proliferated from Latin America through Europe
to Eurasia in past decades. This success has been driven by comparatively few,
but important agreements, which have often replaced earlier free trade agreements.
Since much of the literature simply counts the number of trade agreements to
gauge their relative importance2, this development has been largely overlooked in
1The trade agreements literature frequently uses terms “ regional trade agreement” (RTA)
and “preferential trade agreement” (PTA) in an interchangeable manner. We will follow the
WTO terminology where PTAs refer to the unilateral trade preferences. While the term RTA
is reserved for reciprocal trade agreements. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
region_e/rta_pta_e.htm.
2See Crawford and Fiorentino (2005), WTO (2011), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Du¨r et al.
(2014), Lake (2014), Lake et al. (2014), Missios et al. (2014), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). The
last paper, interestingly, finds a strong theoretical motivation for the contagion effect of CUs via
enlargement but then dismisses the finding observing that the CUs are rare in numbers. At the
same time, their main empirical analysis involves country dyads but, unfortunately, pool CUs
and FTAs. When comparing the dyads, the number of pairs that are in FTA vs CU is actually
very close (e.g., Figure 1 in Freund and Ornelas (2010)).
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the literature3. While in the past, ambitious CU projects were at times notified to
the WTO but without implementation following suit, this situation has reversed
since the early 1990s. In fact, many CUs saw rapid expansion – notably in Europe
– while others were implemented for the first time. Hence, it is important for
research to understand not only why CUs are so strong in political viability, but
also what the welfare consequences are of the expansion of this type of trade
agreement.
Building on the canonical regionalism model with imperfect competition4, we
show that CUs are more politically viable than FTAs, and FTAs can be turned
into CUs. Thus, our analysis suggests that FTAs are not likely to lead to ever–
stronger liberalisation towards third countries (Goyal and Joshi, 2006) (possibly
after a brief period of higher tariffs as in Bagwell and Staiger (1997)), but instead
formation of blocs of CUs with higher external tariffs. But we also show that
customs unions can be an engine for development: even when governments are
favouring firm interests over welfare, social welfare in member states is highest
under CU as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease. This contrasts
with earlier results, such as in Cadot et al. (1999), which found FTAs to welfare–
dominate CUs. Theoretically, our contribution is in considering GATT/WTO
most favoured nation (MFN) regime, FTA and CU in a unified framework that
allows for the political bias in the government’s decisions.
In contrast to earlier papers, we allow for lobbying of governments by domestic
firms and endogenous tariff setting as in Ornelas (2005a). We show that a cus-
3Relating to problems of measurement in trade, see also Lavalle´e and Vicard (2013)
4See Baksi (2014), Krishna (1998), Freund (2000), Ornelas (2005a), Saggi (2006), Goyal and
Joshi (2006), Ornelas (2007) and Zissimos (2011).
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toms union maximizes the political objective of each potential member government
among all possible bilateral agreements, including those not feasible under GATT
principles. While it is well known that formation of a free trade agreement is
sometimes politically viable when countries previously engaged trade under MFN
(Ornelas, 2005a,b), our analysis shows them to be inefficient agreements – they
lead to tariffs that are “too low”, both from a political and member social welfare
perspective. Turning an FTA into a CU is therefore politically viable, but leads
to excessively high external tariffs from a welfare perspective if the government is
biased. However, there are limits to the adverse effects of customs unions: as long
as trade with the rest of the world remains positive, member social welfare under
a CU is higher than under FTA.
Comparing our work with the earlier theoretical findings, most the closely re-
lated is Ornelas (2007). The paper compares the MFN and CU regimes. The
MFN provides flexibility in policy setting by allowing to raise duties from all trad-
ing partners, thus making the marginal cost of a tariff relatively low. Instead,
in the CU the countries are restricted to raising duties only from the rest of the
world. On the flip side the CU brings gains from coordination. Thus, the com-
parison is not straightforward as the set of feasible tariffs of the two regimes is
not the same. Ornelas (2007) was the first to demonstrate that the gains from
coordination of the CU prevail over the losses in flexibility in tariff setting. This
was shown for the case of benevolent government and monopolies in the members
of the CU. However the paper left open whether the results are robust to more
general production structure in member countries, and to the problem of the po-
litical bias of the government. The latter problem is of particular interest because
once the government objective diverts from welfare maximisation, the questions
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of viability of an agreement and its welfare properties do not go hand in hand.
Thus, by considering the unified framework with all three agreements and with a
politically motivated government, we are able to set straight the emerging trade
regime and discover some new insights about the relationship between the social
welfare and the viability of different regimes.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we show empirically how
strongly customs unions have proliferated in recent years, often replacing earlier
FTA relationships. Second, a number of very interesting theoretical studies have
emphasized benign consequences of free trade agreements, showing that even tariffs
on non-members may endogenously fall (Richardson, 1993), that politically viable
FTAs must be globally welfare improving (Ornelas, 2005a) and can pave the path
towards multilateral liberalization (Goyal and Joshi, 2006; Saggi and Yildiz, 2010).
We show that it is politically feasible to turn any bilateral trade relation, including
FTA and MFN, into CUs, and that the stricter equilibrium tariff policy under CU
quite profoundly alters welfare conclusions. Finally, we provide a sufficient – and
easily observable – condition for a customs union to improve social welfare of
members in a political economy setting: as long as trade with non-member states
remains positive, CU improves member social welfare.
We proceed by giving more evidence on the “silent success” of CUs in section
2. Section 3 then introduces the model, and solves the market outcome and tar-
iff setting changes. Section 4 then turns to central results on political viability
and welfare. Subsequently, the next section develops extensions regarding border
effects and asymmetric production structures. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2. Silent Success: Customs Unions replace FTAs
Customs unions have rapidly proliferated around the globe in past decades;
however, this success has been largely obscured for two reasons. First, a large
number of free trade agreements have been de facto superseded by CUs – a fact
not noted in the datasets, and hence frequently overlooked. The EU Eastern En-
largement is a case in point, when the Nice Treaty superseded 62 earlier FTAs
with the stroke of a pen. Second, a number of large CUs have in the past been
notified to the WTO, without implementation following suit (such as the African
Economic Community, created with an incredible 51 members in 1991). At times,
this has led to doubt whether the data on customs union agreements are reliable
after all. In this section, we address both problems: first, using a simple algorithm,
we identify the extent of FTA supersesion in recent decades. Second, we verify
the implementation status of each CU from external sources, presenting – to our
knowledge – the first dataset of implemented CUs, together with the implementa-
tion year of the common external tariff.
Data: Our analysis builds on the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database
by Du¨r et al. (2014), in the version of 18 June 2015. This dataset contains both the
agreements that were notified to the WTO, including their WTO depth status, and
agreements that were not notified to the WTO5. Moreover, for each agreement, a
measure of coverage depth is provided.
5Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand also provide a dataset of regional trade agreements (RTAs)
https://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/. One strength of their dataset that could be helpful for in-
depth analysis of particular agreements is linking the agreements with the original texts. However
their dataset has lower coverage than DESTA and goes only until 2005.
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Customs unions superseding FTAs: We refer to an agreement as superseded
when a new, deeper, agreement is created where all members are included. We need
this procedure to determine the superseded agreements: when a new agreement
that makes an existing one redundant is signed, the redundant weaker agreement
remains technically in force in datasets. Specifically, our algorithm assigns trade
agreement y as superseding trade agreement x if and only if all of the following
conditions are met: the agreement y contains at least all members of agreement
x, it is of greater depth6 than x and agreement x precedes y in time7.
Figure 1 presents the results from this analysis. Importantly, the algorithm
allows us to identify several important episodes of “FTA destruction” when small
FTAs are consolidated into a larger agreement or mature into a customs union.
Most notably, when the treaty of Nice came into force in 2003, 59 earlier free
trade agreements were superseded. Since the earlier FTAs were largely bilateral,
the large number of superseded agreements is not surprising. However, it highlights
the need to go beyond agreement counting in order to gauge the importance of
different types of trade agreements. Other episodes of FTA destruction via FTAs
maturing into CUs are related to the formation of Mercosur and the Eurasian
Customs Union. Moreover, in 1997, the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement con-
solidated 13 previously separate bilateral treaties into one.
Implementation of CU Agreements: For each CU included in the DESTA dataset,
we looked for evidence of implementation of a common external tariff. The con-
6Measured by the TypeDepth variable in the DESTA dataset
7A complete dataset of superseded agreements is available as an online appendix
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8Figure 1: Trade Agreements Created and Superseded: 1980–2014
Note: The depth of the colour corresponds to the depth of the agreement. Agreements in light
grey represent partial scope agreements, in darker grey - FTAs and in black CUs. An agreement
is defined as “superseding” an earlier one if it contains all members of the previous agreement has
a greater depth. All superseded FTAs are superseded by CUs while the PSAs can be superseded
both by FTA and CU.
9Figure 2: Silent Success of Customs Unions: 1992-2014
Note: Countries marked in dark grey of a customs union by 1992; countries in light grey joined
a customs union between 1992 and 2014. We use 1992 as the base year, because this is the first
year where the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union appear in the datasets; 2014
is the last year for which data are available.
firmed implemented CUs are presented in table 1, together with the references
confirming CET implementation and the year when a CET was first applied.
Next, we conducted a further selection among the existing customs unions. The
trade agreement dataset sometimes presents as completely different agreements
the enlargements of existing agreements. For example, EC-Turkey CU, EC-San
Marino and EU enlargements are all, in fact, enlargements of the European Union
Customs Union, rather than unrelated agreements as RTA datasets would suggest.
Similarly, the CU of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and Eurasian Economic
Community are related to one trading system. Again, a similar problem could be
present in the case of FTAs but our analysis takes at face value each FTA while
checking one by one the customs unions. This concern that several agreements can
actually be related to one trading system also speaks for the need of focusing on
agreement profiles of countries or dyadic trade relationships rather than counting
the number of agreements in order to analyse the regional trading systems.
Applying this stringent benchmark in selecting the CUs further highlights the
growing importance of CUs in the world trading systems. We could verify imple-
mentation of the CET for a total of 9 different non-intersecting customs unions
involving 76 countries. Each separate customs union is highlighted in gray while
various agreement that comprise it are listed below. In the case of European Union
Customs Union only the most important agreements are listed. We provide the
name of the agreement and ID number as it enters the DESTA database.
Table 1 presents the number of member countries of each customs union in
1992 and 2012. All CUs were either formed since 1992 or showed a growth in
membership between 1992 and 2012, except for Switzerland–Liechtenstein and the
Southern Africa Customs Union, the two oldest customs unions still in force. The
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number of countries that are members of a customs union more than doubled from
34 to 76 countries in the recent two decades. Table 3 provides the list of members
of each verified customs union in 1992 and 2012.
Additionally, Table 1 presents the year of ratification of each relevant agreement
that is related to each separate customs union and the year of implementation of
the common external tariff. The last column lists the sources we used to identify
the implementation of the CET.
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Table 1: Worldwide list of CUs with Implementation of Common External Tariff
Year # Members
No Agreement Name Ratif. Impl. 1992 2014 Source
Andean Community 1987 1995 0 4 Gomez (2014)
27 Quito Protocol 1987
23 Trujillo Protocol 1996
694 Sucre Protocol 1997
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 1973 1973 13 15 CARICOM (2011),
171 Caribbean Community(CARICOM) 1973 Sadikov (2013)
177 Caribbean Community(CARICOM) 2001
638 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States(OECS) 1981
East African Community (EAC) 1999 2005 0 5 EAC (2015)
787 East African Community(EAC) 1999
Eurasian Customs Union 2009 2010 0 3 Mkrtchyan (2013), EAEU (2015)
108 Belarus Russia 1995
435 Eurasian Economic Community 1995
104 Belarus Kazakhstan Russia 2009
European Union Customs Union1 1957 1958 15 31 EC (2015a),
293 EC 1957 1958 EC (2015b),
28 Andorra EC 1990
341 EC San Marino 1991
327 EC Maastricht 1992 EC (2015c),
355 EC Turkey 1995
335 EC Nice 2001 EUR-Lex (2015)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2001 2003 0 6 Fasano-Filho (2003)
473 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1981
474 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2001
MERCOSUR 1991 1995 0 5 Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998)
604 MERCOSUR 1991
Southern Africa Customs Union 1910 1970 5 5 McCarthy (2003),
- Southern Africa Customs Union 1910 SACU (2015)
669 Southern Africa Customs Union 1969
670 Southern Africa Customs Union 2000
Central American Common Market 0 5 Bronchi and Chua (2005),
186 Central American Common Market (CACM) 1960 1997 Bulmer-Thomas (1998)
714 Protocol of Guatemala 1993
790 El Salvador Guatemala 2000
ECOWAS2 1966 2013 0 15 Von Uexkull and Shui (2014),
726 UDEAO 1966
780 West African Econonomic Community (CEAO) 1973
688 West African Economic and Monetary Union 1994 Goretti and Weisfeld (2008)
366 Economic Community Of West African States 1975
367 Economic Community Of West African States 1993
600 Mano River Union 1973
- Switzerland-Liechtenstein 1923 1923 2 2 WTO (2000)
Total 35 96
.
Notes: Related Document Number and Name correspond to the agreements listed in the DESTA database which is itself
based on the WTO RTA database.
1 There are more agreements related to the European Union Customs Union in the DESTA database listed as independent
RTAs. Only several most important ones are included here for economy of space. The full list of associated agreements for
the EUCU and other CUs can be found in the online appendix.
2 Members of ECOWAS participated in regional integration in smaller groups with intersecting membership as well, - West
African Monetary Zone and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which became customs union prior to
ECOWAS as WAEMU adopted a CET in 2000. Additionally, 4 ECOWAS members are also members of the Mano River
Union (MRU) created in 1973; MRU becamse a CU with a CET first in 1977, but shortly after became ineffective until the
revival in 2008 (World Bank, 2013). Alva and Behar (2009) discuss the complex structure of African RTAs and the levels of
integration
3. Silent success: theory
This section develops a standard model of regional trading blocs where govern-
ments choose between a Most Favoured Nation regime (no regional agreement), a
Free Trade Agreement and a Customs Union. Our goal is to extend this model
where either of three regimes can arise endogenously to a more general indus-
trial competition structure and allow for a politically motivated government. We
find that this standard model is predicting the spread of customs unions: it is
chosen by the governments over a more protectionist regime (MFN) and more
liberal regime (FTA). Note, this happens as government may not be benevolent
but driven by contributions from firms and, as we show, for almost all parameter
values firms would be better off under MFN. This is due to the balance brought
by customs unions: the more the government would be driven by firm interest
that would prefer MFN and be more protectionist, the more the consumers would
lose, thus making the CU a preferred regime by the government. The extentions
section modifies the model in several ways, including introduction of asymmetries
of production structures, where the result still holds. This robustness of customs
unions as a trade regime choice in the model helps to develop an intuition for the
empirical success we argued for above.
Our set-up closely follows the standard regionalism model under imperfect com-
petition with segmented markets as in Brander and Krugman (1983). Further, in
Ornelas (2005a), governments take an active role – endogenously setting their ex-
ternal tariff policy and choosing preferential trade agreements to optimally meet
their objectives. The model contains three stages: first, governments may choose
to ratify an RTA. Second, government sets the optimal tariffs, taking the RTA
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as given. Finally, market outcomes unfold through the actions of firms and con-
strained by the tariff policy in place. The main departure from previous papers is
that we model customs unions as a potential trade agreement in addition to FTA
and MFN (i.e., absence of agreement). Thus, our analysis covers all “exceptions”
to the MFN principle of GATT XXIV in a unified setting.
Countries and Markets : Our world economy consists of two potential partner
countries in a trade agreement - indexed i and j respectively - and the rest of the
world, k. Each country has n firms producing a homogeneous good under con-
stant returns to scale with marginal cost normalised to zero (called “imperfectly
competitive good”). Markets are nationally segmented and have Cournot compe-
tition; thus, each firm from country l sets a vector of quantities {qhl} determining
its output in a given market h for all h, l = i, j, k8. Furthermore, there is one
numeraire good produced competitively.
There is a representative consumer in each country, whose utility is linear in
the competitive good and quadratic in the imperfectly competitive good. Hence,
the utility function of a consumer in country h is given by:
u(Qh) = ΓQh − (Q2h/2), where Qh =
∑
l∈{i,j,k}
qhl is the total output available in the
country.
Welfare and Government Objective: We define the social welfare, W , in a
standard manner: it is the sum of consumer surplus, tariff revenue and producers
8first letter in the subscript will always denote the market and the second - the origin.
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profits:
Wh(th; t−h) = Wh(th) + (1 + α)Πh(th; t−h) (1)
where CSh and Πh are consumer and producer surplus respectively, and TRh
denotes the tariff revenue.
Government preferences are defined as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), i.e.
the government values increases in national welfare, but gives an extra bias –
measured by α – to “contributions” received from industry. This gives rise to a
government objective function as follows:
Gh(th; t−h) = CSh(th; t−h) + TRh(th) + (1 + α)Πh(th; t−h) (2)
The parameter α ≥ 0 represents the political bias, through which producer in-
terests are overweighted when policy is determined. As in Ornelas (2005a), we
follow Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) in deriving the political bias as the set
of efficient outcomes of a bargaining game between firms and the government:
in the absence of contributions, the government sets the welfare maximising tar-
iff (disagreement point). Firms, whose ownership is concentrated, are willing to
compensate the government for deviations from the welfare maximising tariff with
an increased contribution. As Ornelas (2005a, section 2.3) shows, the efficient
outcomes of this bargaining process satisfy the first–order condition of 2.
Due to the segmented markets assumption of the model, a government’s first
order condition for tariff setting does not depend on tariffs of other countries;
hence we drop the arguments t−h henceforth to simplify the notation.
The industry profits Πh of the firms from h consist of the profits made at home,
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denoted Πhh and profits made in a foreign country l, denoted as Πlh.
Trade Agreements and External Tariffs : We model all three permissible bilat-
eral trade regimes under article XXIV. In a customs union (CU), the external tariff
is set cooperatively; in practice, an intergovernmental body is often created that
determines the external tariff policy. In line with the literature, we assume that
the external tariff is chosen to maximise the joint welfare of the partner countries.
Two important constraints apply: first, internal tariff barriers must be eliminated
as in an FTA. Additionally, the external tariffs imposed by each partner country
i and j on the rest of the world k must be equal:
tCU = argmax
ti,tj
Gi(t) +Gj(t) (3)
s.t. tij = 0, tji = 0
tik = tjk
In a free trade area (FTA), the member government is committed to a zero
internal tariff with its partner; it remains to impose, non–cooperatively, the po-
litically optimal tariff on firms from country k k. This yields the problem for a
country h in an FTA:
tFTAh = argmax
th
Gh(t) (4)
s.t. thk = 0, h ∈ {i, j}
for each member state.
When a country is not in any trade agreement – so tariffs are set merely ac-
cording to the most favoured nation principle (MFN) – in the world of our model
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the government country h imposes equal tariffs on both other countries. Hence,
each government’s problem is
tMFNh = argmax
th
Gh(t) (5)
s.t. thl = thm, h, l,m ∈ {i, j, k}
Ratification and Timing : In the first period (“ratification stage”), countries i
and j simultaneously announce a trade agreement they would be willing to en-
ter with the other country, φh ∈ {FTA,CU,MFN}. If countries make the same
announcement, the agreement is implemented; otherwise, MFN prevails. Then
follows the “tariff–setting stage”, in which the governments or Commission of the
customs union determines external tariff so as to maximise the objective functions
just described. Finally, firms produce and consumers consume in the “market out-
come stage”.
Solution Method : Given the sequential, perfect information structure of the
game, the solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and we proceed
by backwards induction. Since solution of the last stage – market outcomes – is
standard, we relegate the relevant calculations to the appendix.
In the remaining part for expositional purposes the presenation will be made
for the country i.
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3.1. Trade Agreements and Tariff Policy
It is a “safe bet” that preferential trade agreements profoundly alter the incen-
tives of governments to set external tariffs (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). This tariff
channel is the fundamental reason why FTA and CU affect world trade differently.
Hence, this section establishes a comparative view of external tariff policy, first
comparing the two types of preferential trade agreement, and then a discussion of
CU vis–a–vis MFN.
Customs Union vs FTA: In a free trade area, each partner country unilaterally
solves problem 4, while a single supranational institution determines the joint
external tariff for both members under CU, solving problem 3. While in principle,
FTA members could charge different tariffs, it is an equilibrium outcome that their
external tariffs are identical; hence one may compare the FTA and CU tariff levels
directly:
Lemma 1. External Tariffs: Customs Union vs FTA
1. A free trade agreement imposes a strictly lower external tariff than a customs
union, tFTAik < t
CU
ik
2. The stronger the political bias, the more CU external tariff exceeds FTA
Proof. See Appendix
As Saggi (2006) and Ornelas (2007) emphasise, centralised tariff setting in
a customs union leads to consideration of profits arising from cross–border trade;
hence, tariffs are higher. While a stronger political bias leads to higher tariffs both
under FTA and CU, the effect in a CU is even stronger – because the marginal
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political returns to higher tariffs are larger in CU than FTA. This is due to ab-
sence of “leakage”, in the terminology of Freund and Ornelas (2010): a higher
tariff benefits always also the partner country, and only under CU are those gains
internalised in endogenous tariff setting. However Bohara et al. (2004) find some
evidence for the tariff complementarity in the formation process of MERCOSUR
in Argentina’s tariffs - as the average tariff went up to be closer aligned with the
Brazilian tariff and the internal tariff was going down, the tariffs in the sectors
most affected by the trade diversion saw a decrease.
Estevadeordal et al. (2008) study the impact of the RTAs of 10 Latin Ameri-
can countries on the non-member tariffs. Consistently with theory, they find that
moving from an FTA to a CU (cases of MERCOSUR and Andean Community)
leads to an increase in the tariffs towards non-members.
Customs Union vs Most Favoured Nation: MFN tariffs are higher than CU
ones, but the effects are complex. In an MFN regime, tariff revenue and domestic
profits are higher than under CU, calling also for higher tariffs at the margin. On
the other hand, consumer surplus is lower, and would call for a lower tariff. In
principle, the comparison could thus go either way. In Ornelas (2007), for example,
the potential partners each have a single firm while the number of firms in the rest
of the world is a parameter. In this environment, the CU tariff is higher than
MFN when the number of firms abroad is sufficiently large and otherwise below.
In contrast, the present model has an arbitrary, but symmetric, number of firms in
each country, allowing a definitive comparison of the tariffs (we relax the symmetry
assumption in section 5.2):
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Lemma 2. External Tariffs: Customs Union vs MFN
i. Under MFN, the external tariff is strictly higher than under customs union:
tMFNik > t
CU
ik
ii. The stronger the political bias, the more the MFN tariff exceeds the CU ex-
ternal tariff
Proof. See Appendix
Magee and Lee (2001) show that the European Economic Community, created
from an MFN basis, led to a mild decrease (0.9%) in the average tariffs, similar to
the theoretical prediction.
4. Political Viability and Welfare
Given the political tariffs determined in the previous section, we now study
which agreements are politically viable. We show that the Customs Unions dom-
inates all other RTAs in this regard. Hence, the formation of a CU can always
occur in equilibrium; however, an example demonstrates that this does not rule
the possibility that an FTA may be formed. We next turn a careful welfare analy-
sis and provide the central result: a CU also leads to the highest social welfare in
member countries as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease. This
holds in spite of excessively high tariffs due to lobbying. One may thus say that
political viability and member welfare go hand in hand.
Political Viability: In the first stage, the potential partner governments simul-
taneously announce a trade agreement they would be willing to the enter with
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the respective other; if the announcements match, the agreement is implemented;
else MFN prevails. Due to political bias, governments take into account not only
welfare considerations when proposing an agreement, but also rents that can po-
tentially be obtained from producers. Thus, political viability in our context is
a separate concern from social welfare, a point of departure from the models of
Ornelas (2007), Saggi et al. (2013) and Yi (1996).
Customs union choice is payoff dominant for the government over any other
trade agreement. In other words, a CU not only outperforms FTA and MFN from
a government payoff perspective, but those not permitted under GATT/WTO
rules (e.g. containing only partial goods coverage or reducing, but not eliminating
internal tariffs). This generalisation is a more technical contribution of the fol-
lowing proposition; it suggests that the twin requirements to “eliminate” internal
tariffs on “substantially all” trade may not necessarily constrain governments in
practice9.
Proposition 1. For all values of the political bias, and any number of firms, a
customs union yields strictly higher government payoff in each member country
than
i. trade under the most favoured nation principle
ii. a free trade agreement
iii. any other possible bilateral agreement, including those ruled out by GATT/WTO
Proof. See Appendix
9In line with practical experience, cf Mavroidis (2006, 2011).
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Most closely related, in Ornelas (2007, proposition 2), a special case of results
(i) and (ii) is obtained for social welfare maximising governments and monopoly
production in the partner countries. In that framework10, the CU implements
the social welfare maximising tariffs; MFN and FTA imply different tariffs, and
consequently must lead to lower welfare. In contrast, in a setting with political
bias, all regimes are subject to different distortions; as the proposition showed,
these distortions do not challenge the government payoff dominance of the customs
union.
When comparing FTA and CU regimes, only the external tariff changes since
internal tariffs are already eliminated. Here, the advantages of CU from a govern-
ment perspective are clear: improved coordination not only increases social welfare,
but also producer profits; due to political bias, the CU is a fortiori preferred over
MFN. In contrast, the comparison between CU and MFN is more intricate – tariffs
change not only with respect to the rest of the world, but also discontinuously with
the partner country. As it turns out, from the government’s perspective, higher
home market profits under MFN do not outweigh the loss of market access to the
partner country.
To see why custom unions dominate also other possible trade agreements, the
intuition is two–fold. First, tariffs on internal trade are a transfer from producers
in the partner country and domestic consumers to the government purse; especially
if producer lobbying is politically important. Governments thus want to eliminate
internal tariffs - even if they were not forced to do so - when forming an optimal
bilateral agreement. In fact, if import subsidies were allowed, they would be called
10Corresponding to parameters N = 1 and α = 0 in our model, for the case when the number
of firms in all three countries is equal
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for both, to further boost profits and reduce underproduction implied by imperfect
competition. Second, due to the symmetry of the model, there is no reason for
the partner countries to want to charge different tariffs; hence this constraint is
also non-binding. As we show in section 5.2, the result extends to the case of
asymmetric production structures.
Since CUs are relatively protectionist, one may be tempted to think that firms
necessarily prefer this trade agreement. However, as the following lemma shows,
that is not the case: as the number of firms increases over monopoly, firms prefer
MFN rather than CU, for that is the trade regime that maximises their profits:
Lemma 3. For any n > 1 and any level government bias, firms prefer MFN over
other trade regimes. In case of monopolies, n = 1, the firms prefer customs union.
Proof. See appendix
Thus, the industry profits are higher under MFN when the markets are com-
petitive. This result is related to the ability of the government to raise duties from
both partners under MFN. While the industry profits are higher in CU in the case
of fewer firms, government prefers CU even when it puts an extra weight on the
firms. The happens because the CU, as a more liberal to the MFN regime, delivers
higher consumer surplus. As a result, as the government becomes more concerned
with the industry profits, the difference in the government payoff under MFN and
CU does not change change monotonically. Interestingly, despite that, we show
that for any number of firms and any level of government bias the CU is preferred
by the government to the MFN, even when the MFN would lead to higher industry
profits as then the effects of the more liberal regime of the CU dominates.
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The reason is that in the cases where the industry prefers the MFN, the CU
brings such an increase in consumer surplus through higher consumption, that this
difference combined with endogenous tariff setting (i.e. d(tMFN − tCU)/dα > 0),
guarantees that CU is always preferred to the MFN by the government, even when
it values firm contributions and firms prefer MFN.
Politically Viable Agreements : Since customs unions are so successful in raising
government payoff, it is a corollary that forming such a trade agreement is always
an equilibrium of the ratification subgame:
Corollary 1. There is always an equilibrium where a customs union is formed
Proof. By proposition 1, the government payoff is maximised under CU among all
possible bilateral agreements. This implies that there is no profitable deviation
to another RTA when both countries propose CU, and hence formation of CU is
always an equilibrium.
Customs unions are “politically dominant” over other RTAs, and this is re-
flected in the world integration experience of recent decades. On the theory side,
the logic of the model is clear: in the agreement ratification stage, CU must dom-
inate over MFN and FTA from a government payoff perspective. This does not
rule that another agreement may be ratified – for example, Ornelas (2005a) studies
the welfare properties of equilibria where government payoff under FTA exceeds
MFN, and hence FTA is politically viable. Importantly, in our extended model,
adoption of an FTA or failure to agree on any RTA (i.e MFN) arise due to co-
ordination failure. This begs the question whether the dominance of CUs is an
artifact of our assumptions, or provides an interesting new look at the world of
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regional integration. Our empirical work in section 2 firmly suggests the latter:
much of the growth in FTAs in the 1990s was driven by preparation for the East-
ern Enlargement of the European Union, or restoration of soviet economic links
in the CIS11 (Schott, 2011); in practice – although not in the datasets commonly
used by researchers – many FTAs have since been superseded by CUs. Second,
even adopting a relatively strict standard on CU implementation, outside of North
America and Asia, the important regional trade links of the world are increasingly
managed through customs unions.
Customs unions may be hampered by exogenous political or institutional con-
straints. As Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) and Fiorentino et al. (2007) discuss,
political alliances are, in practice, determinants of the formation of both FTA and
CU. Perhaps coordination failures are more likely among governments that are not
politically aligned, or disagreement on non–economic issues could delay the adop-
tion of an otherwise politically viable CU. Second, our analysis presupposes that a
supranational organization is formed in such a way that it sets the external tariff
to maximize joint government payoff. Facchini et al. (2013) demonstrate that a
CU with strategic delegation may yield poor outcomes: the median voter in each
country is tempted to strategically delegate a highly protectionist representative
to the CU commission; but this then causes the CU to set extraordinarily high
tariffs; in their setting, a CU may fail to be formed for some parameter cases.
The political dominance of customs unions has important implications for mod-
els that study properties of politically viable FTAs. For example, Ornelas (2005a,
corollary 2) states that “every country gains when an FTA is formed”: FTAs
11Commonwealth of Independent States.
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benefit third countries, due to lower tariffs, and welfare reducing FTAs cannot
be ratified in the potential partner countries. Our result indicates that this view
may be short–sighted: in the longer run, standard arguments lead on to expect
that a CU should be implemented instead of the coordination failure equilibrium
of FTA. But CUs have negative welfare consequences to third countries; thus, a
careful welfare assessment of RTAs is needed in this more general model.
Welfare Trade–Offs Among RTAs: When governments are politically biased,
they will not implement optimal policies from a social welfare perspective. How-
ever, depending on the trade regime in place, distortions take somewhat different
forms. Figure 3 summarizes the comparative statics of tariffs with respect to polit-
ical bias in the different cases: compared to the member welfare–maximising tariff
levels, FTAs are too liberal and CUs (weakly) too protectionist; MFN – since all
trade is covered by tariffs – is the most protectionist. Adopting a “second–best”
perspective, this section investigates which trade regime provides the highest mem-
ber social welfare in this setting.
Interestingly, lobbying is not necessarily welfare reducing. While in a CU,
political bias necessarily hurts member welfare, in an FTA, stronger lobbying nec-
essarily increases social welfare. The reason being that tariffs are initially too low
from a welfare perspective, so – whatever the motive for raising tariffs – leads to
better welfare outcomes. This is the central result of the following proposition:
Proposition 2. As political bias in member countries increases,
i. member social welfare under FTA increases
ii. member social welfare under CU decreases
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Figure 3: Comparison of Trade Regimes: Tariffs and Comparative Statics under Political Bias
tij
tik
tFTA tW tCU
tMFN
Proof.
i. member social welfare under FTA increases
The welfare change as the government bias changes in FTA is given below.
The social welfare that was defined in (1) does not directly depend on the
political bias but only through the tariff changes. Thus we apply the chain
rule due to changes in the tariff of the respective member as a result of the
change in the bias:
dWFTAi
dα
=
∂WFTAi
∂tik
∂tFTAik
∂α
+
∂WFTAi
∂tjk
∂tFTAjk
∂α
∂WFTAi
∂tik
∂tFTAik
∂α
=
∂(GFTAi − αΠFTAi )
∂tik
∂tFTAik
∂α
= −αdΠ
FTA
ii
dα
The second equality follows from the following two observations:
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∂GFTAi
∂tFTAik
= 0 and
∂αΠFTAi
∂tik
=
∂αΠFTAii
∂tik
∂WFTAi
∂tjk
∂tFTAjk
∂α
=
∂ΠFTAji
∂tjk
∂tFTAjk
∂α
=
dΠFTAji
dα
Combining the first and second partial derivatives we obtain:
dWFTAi
dα
= −αdΠ
FTA
ii
dα
+
dΠFTAji
dα
= (1− α)dΠ
FTA
ii
dα
> 0,
as α < 1 whenever there is positive trade with the rest of the world and
ΠFTAii = Π
FTA
ji in FTA.
ii. member social welfare under CU decreases
Again, social welfare is impacted by the change in the bias through the tariff
changes. In the case of the CU, there are no two different tariffs but a
common external tariff tik = tjk = tk
dWCUi
dα
=
∂WCUi
∂tk
∂tCUk
∂α
=
∂(GCUi − αΠCUi )
∂tk
∂tCU
∂α
,
∂GCUi
∂tCUk
= 0 =>
dWCUi
dα = −
αdΠCUi
dα < 0
The central contribution of this proposition is to show that political bias raises
social welfare under FTA in absolute terms, while earlier results established only
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“differences in differences”12. For example, in Ornelas (2005a, proposition 4), it is
shown that FTA improves member welfare by more relative to MFN, the stronger
the political bias. We now turn to the comparison of CU with MFN, where a
differences in differences result is of interest:
Proposition 3. As political bias increases, member social welfare under MFN
decreases faster than under CU
Proof. First, let us describe the welfare change in the MFN regime as the political
bias is increasing. Under the MFN the countries do not discriminate among other
countries, hence tik = tij = t
MFN
i and tjk = tji = t
MFN
j
dWMFNi
dα
=
∂WMFNi
∂ti
∂tMFNi
∂α
+
∂WMFNi
∂tj
∂tMFNj
∂α
,
dWMFNi
dα
=
∂(GMFNi − αΠMFNi )
∂ti
∂tMFNi
∂α
+
∂ΠMFNji
∂tj
∂tMFNj
∂α
=>
dWMFNi
dα
= −α∂Π
MFN
ii
∂ti
∂tMFNi
∂α
+
∂ΠMFNji
∂tj
∂tMFNj
∂α
< 0,
where the last expression equality follows from the following two observations:
∂GMFNi
∂tMFNi
= 0 and
∂αΠMFNi
∂tMFNi
=
∂αΠMFNii
∂tMFNi
The welfare in MFN is decreasing as the bias
increases as both channels, the two components of
dWMFNi
dα
, are negative. As the
political motivations of the government lead to welfare decrease both in MFN and
CU, we should look at the difference:
dWMFNi
dα
− dW
CU
i
dα
= −αdΠ
MFN
ii
dα
+
dΠMFNji
dα
− (−αdΠ
CU
i
dα
)
12We thank Emanuel Ornelas for pointing this out
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= −αdΠ
MFN
ii
dα
+
dΠMFNji
dα
+
αdΠCUii
dα
+
αdΠCUji
dα
= α(
dΠCUii
dα
+
dΠCUji
dα
− dΠ
MFN
ii
dα
) +
dΠMFNji
dα
= α(
∂ΠCUii
∂tk
∂tCUk
∂α
+
∂ΠCUji
∂tk
∂tCUk
∂α
− ∂Π
MFN
ii
∂ti
∂tMFNi
∂α
) +
∂ΠMFNji
∂tj
∂tMFNj
∂α
= α(2
2n(Γ + ntCUk )
(3n+ 1)2
∂tCUk
∂α
− 4n(Γ + 2nt
MFN
i )
(3n+ 1)2
∂tMFNi
∂α
) +
∂ΠMFNji
∂tMFNj
∂tMFNj
∂α
Now note the first part of the expression, the part in brackets, is negative as
tCUk < t
MFN
j and
∂tCUk
∂α
<
∂tMFNj
∂α
by Lemma 2. The second part of the expression is
negative, too, as in MFN firms from i pay tariff when exporting to j, thus, their
profit decreases as the tariff tMFNj in j increases. Hence,
dWMFNi
dα
− dW
CU
i
dα
< 0
Having established the comparative statics of the trade regimes with respect
to political bias, our interest turns to the critical question of levels : is it possible
to state which regime provides the highest member social welfare?
Proposition 4. Member social welfare is maximised under CU vis-a-vis MFN and
FTA, for any level of product market competition and any political bias consistent
with positive trade with the rest of the world.
Proof. a) First, let us compare welfare under CU and FTA under the presence of
possible bias of the government. When the government is benevolent, that is, α =
0, then the viability and welfare coincide and we can apply the Proposition 1. By
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Proposition 1, in this case the CU implements member welfare maximising tariffs,
which obviously dominates the (lower) FTA tariffs. However, as per Proposition 2,
as α increases, the welfare in the CU is decreasing and instead increasing in FTA.
Thus to prove the result, it is sufficient to compare the welfare at the highest bias
level where trade with the rest of the world is about to cease, i.e. α = 1
4n
. 3.
Bearing in mind that due to linear demand the welfare function is quadratic and
thus has an axis of symmetry going through the vertex. It follows that any two
tariff levels equidistant from the vertex deliver the same welfare level. Further,
by concavity, a tariff point that is closer to the vertex provides higher welfare
than another point that has larger distance from the vertex. In order to compare
the welfare under CU and FTA at α = 1
4n
, we analyse the distance from tariff of
each regime from the tariff that maximizes social welfare, tW . From Proposition
1 the tW is the tariff of benevolent government in CU, so we have to show that
|tCU(α = 1
4n
)− tW | < |tFTA(α = 1
4n
)− tW |.
|tCU − tW | = Γ
1+2n
− 4nΓ
2(1+2n)2+n
(6)
Similarly, the distance between FTA and welfare maximising tariff is
|tFTA − tW | = 4nΓ
2(1+2n)2+n
− Γ(2n+ 32 )
( 1
2
+2n)n+2(1+2n)2
(7)
Then,
|tFTA − tW | − |tCU − tW | = Γ(3n+ 1)(32n
3 + 4n2 − 17n− 6)
(2n+ 1)(8n2 + 9n+ 2)(20n2 + 17n+ 4)
>, 0
The inequality follows because n ≥ 1, and hence each bracket is of positive sign.
Thus, member social welfare under CU is higher at α = 1
4n
.
The intuition for the result depends on the trade regime being compared with
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CU. When comparing the FTA and CU, it is the welfare result with a politically
motivated government is counter-intuitive. Indeed, as government places higher
weight on the firms’ interests, the social welfare in the customs union is decreasing.
At the same time, the less benevolent the government, the higher the social welfare
under the FTA! However we show that with any number of firms and government
bias, the coordination brought by CU gives such a strong welfare boost that as
long as the CU is not in autarky, it provides higher welfare. The intuition is the
following: if the number of firms in member countries is low, then the coordination
gain of the CU is very strong and remains, albeit diminished, even when the bias
increases. And when the number of firms is large, i.e. the markets are more
competitive, then the extra protectionism that the CU and political bias bring are
limited as there are low returns from protectionism, again putting the coordination
gains of the CU above the losses even when the government’s objective is politically
motivated.
One can find examples with strong political bias, where the CU already ceased
external trade, but the FTA is actually quite close to implementing the member-
welfare maximising tariff. What the proposition shows is that trade with the
rest of the world being positive under CU is a sufficient condition to ensure that
member welfare is also higher under CU than FTA. The link to the non-members
positive exports is also intuitive: the bias, while affecting the members, also has a
strong negative impact on non-member exports. We think this particular bound is
interesting because it’s a very conservative requirement and can easily be observed
empirically.
Customs unions also imply greater member welfare than under MFN. As the
preceding discussion showed, the MFN regime implies by far the highest “tariff
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wall”. Implementation of a CU improves market access in the partner country
– benefiting producer profits – and reduces the prices consumers face, as tariffs
are either eliminated (with respect to the partner country), or reduced (vis-a-vis
the rest of the world). Thus, the welfare advantages of the CU as a function of
the political bias are rather straightforward: as the bias goes up, the CU is less
protectionst relative to MFN while still providing the gains from coordination.
However, as we saw in the previous section, the viability is not straightforward
and not monotone, depending on the competitiveness in each country.
Our results thus extend the earlier findings in several dimensions: comparing
CU both to FTA and MFN, while allowing for politically motivated government
and allowing arbitrary number of firms n in member countries. Interestingly, the
CU is thus preferred both to a more liberal regime (FTA) and more protectionist
one (MFN).
Impact on Outsiders and Global Welfare: Yi (1996) shows that the formation of
a customs union with benevolent governments reduces the welfare of non-members
compared to the MFN setting. And the position of the non-members is worsening
as the number of countries in a customs union increases. The presence of the
political motivations of the governments only makes negative impact stronger. At
the same time, the global welfare is higher under a customs union. Indeed, the
positive tariffs increase the distortions of the imperfect competition by reducing
the total production. Thus, as the customs union has lower tariffs than the MFN
world, aggregate welfare increases.
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5. Border costs and asymmetric production
This section relaxes some of the assumptions of the model to consider the
equilibrium outcomes for a more general and realistic setting. First, we look at the
impact of non-tariff border costs of trade. Unlike MFN or FTA, customs union
can alleviate internal non-tariff costs. We find that the presence of the border
costs has tariff reduction effect on the customs union tariff. This effect works in
the opposite direction to the coordination effect, thus balancing the tariff increase
associated with the move from an FTA to the CU. As we discuss below, this is in
line with the empirical findings that the CU leads to moderately higher tariffs than
in FTA. Second, we extend the standard model by incorporating the asymmetric
production structure. We consider a case where the rest of the world produces
all goods while the countries that would form a trade agreement each produce
different imperfectly competitive goods. That structure replicates Facchini et al.
(2013), but without their assumption on the delegation. We find that our results
regarding the political viability and welfare dominance of the CU relative to other
two agreements hold. This implies that both asymmetric production structure and
the delegation assumption, as in Facchini et al. (2013), are necessary to obtain
parameter intervals where the customs union is not formed.
5.1. Trade Costs and Border Effects
Customs unions are highly effective in raising bilateral trade. As Roy (2010)
shows, when two countries form a CU with each other, trade between them on
average doubles after ten years, while gains from FTA are much smaller. Stan-
dard theory indeed predicts that a CU should lead to an increase in trade between
partners, driven by a higher external tariff, although the predicted magnitude is
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smaller. This may be due to the omission of border effects in the model; here, we
present an extension allowing for CU members to close internal customs point and
hence reducing trade costs. This has two effects: it mitigates, and possibly over-
turns, increases in the external tariff vis-a-vis FTA; and considerably strengthens
the trade-creating effect of a CU. Since number of CU member countries, both in
Africa and Eurasia, also score poorly on the World Bank’s Trading Across Borders
index, reductions in non-tariff costs may be important in understanding the ap-
parent success of CU (see also Krueger (1997) in alleviating rules of origin (ROO)
issues; see also Stoyanov (2012) for ROO issues in Canada-US trade.
We now augmented the model to allow for real trade costs. Let cij be the
non–tariff cost, per unit, incurred when trading from country i to country j. The
border costs, present under MFN, do not get abolished also under a free trade
agreement. Indeed, the latter only sets the tariff costs to zero but the border
crossings and ROO remain. Customs union, instead, provides an opportunity to
remove the border costs through the abolishment of the ROO and, frequently, the
internal customs controls. We will now see how the exogenous reduction in border
costs associated with the customs union affects the external tariff in the CU.
The per-unit trade cost enters the model as a marginal cost incurred by all
exporting firms in the MFN and FTA but not by domestic firms. In the customs
union the border cost is only born by the exporting firms from the rest of the world
due to the reduction in internal trade costs in the CU. Below is the government
objective in the CU, GCU , with the altered firm cost function:
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GCU =
(3Γn−n(tik+cij+cik))2
2(3n+1)2
+ ntik
(Γ−(1+2n)(tik+cik)+ncij)
3n+1 + (8)
+(1 + α)n (Γ+n(tik+cik))
2
(3n+1)2
+ (1 + α)n
(Γ+n(tik+cjk−cji))2
(3n+1)2
Similar to the tariff complementarity effect we discussed earlier, a reduction in
trade cost cij then leads to a fall in the external tariff of a CU:
Proposition 5. The larger the reduction in internal trade costs in a CU, the more
the external tariff falls
Proof. After augmenting the model with trade costs cik ≥ 0, and solving for exter-
nal tariff analogously to the procedure in baseline model, one finds the first order
conditions for tik:
−n(3Γn−n(tik+cij+cik)
(3n+1)2
+
n(Γ−(1+2n)(tik+cij)+ncij
3n+1 +
−(1+2n)ntik
3n+1 +
+2(α+1)n
2(Γ+n(tik+cik))
(3n+1)2
+
2(α+1)n2(Γ+n(tik+cjk−cji))
(3n+1)2
= 0
Apply implicit differentiation to obtain the result:
tCU
dcij
= − n(3n+ 2)
(1− 4αn)n+ 2(2n+ 1)2 > 0
Since α < 1
4n
by assumption 1, the expression is positive. Hence a reduction in
internal trade costs leads to a lower external tariff, as claimed.
Reduction in trade costs provide a further rationale for CU formation, which
also attenuates adverse effects on non–member countries. Aside from the direct
positive welfare effect of a reduction in trade costs, tariff complementarity forces
also lead to a reduction in the external tariff once internal borders are eliminated.
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This may offset some of the tariff increase expected when a CU is formed. Em-
pirical evidence from both MERCOSUR and the Eurasian Customs Union showed
typically mild tariff increases after CU formation, consistent with the effect of
reduced trade costs (Mkrtchyan, 2013).
5.2. Asymmetric Production
We now extend the baseline model to incorporate asymmetric production struc-
tures. As in Facchini et al. (2013), we now consider the case of two imperfectly
competitive goods; each of the potential partner countries has n firms, but pro-
duces only one of the goods. In the rest of the world, both goods are produced by
n firms each. Letting x denote the good produced in country i, and y the good
produced in country j, we have the following production structure:n 0 n
0 n n

The utility function is linear–quadratic in each good, directly generalising from
the baseline above. All other elements of the model remain unchanged. It follows
that the best response functions of each firm remains the same. The government,
however, now sets two tariff lines: one for the good produced domestically, and
one for the imported good. This yields the following optimal external tariffs:
Proposition 6. External Tariffs under Asymmetric Production
i. The external tariff for the domestically produced good a is invariant to the
trade regime: tMFNi,a = t
FTA
i,a = t
CU
i,a
ii. The external tariff on the non–produced good b is lowest in FTA, intermediate
in MFN and highest under CU: tFTAi,b < t
MFN
i,b < t
CU
i,b .
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Proof. See Appendix
In the asymmetric production setting, CU is now the most protectionist trade
regime. For the domestically produced good, government incentives for tariff set-
ting do not change when a RTA is formed with the partner country: there is, by
construction, no competition from firms in the partner country when an FTA is
formed – hence removing the tariff complementarity effect. When forming a CU,
due to symmetric utility functions, the CU objective for setting of the external
tariff simply becomes a monotonic transformation of the original problem; this
also leaves tariffs unchanged. Tariffs on the good that is fully imported are lowest
under the – due to tariff complementarity, since the country already committed
to a zero internal tariff with the partner. In contrast to the symmetric setting,
tariffs under MFN are now lower than under CU. Tariffs are highest under the
CU because profit effects are fully internalised.
These differences in tariff structures do not affect results on political viability
and member welfare of CU compared to the baseline setting. In the CU the tariff
on the good that is not produced domestically is matched to the level of the partner
country tariff. Thus it is clear that the consumer surplus and tariff revenue for
the only-import good in the CU is lower than under the MFN and FTA, – the
country engages in extra protection the good it has no firms in. However the
upside comes from gaining similar protection in the domestically produced good
in the partner country. The home country extends fully its level of protection to
the partner. The trade-off between the losses in the only-import good and gains
in the home-produced good define the overall outcome. Hence,
Proposition 7. i. There is always an equilibrium where a CU is formed
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ii. Member social welfare is maximised under CU, as long as trade with the rest
of the world does not cease.
Proof. See Appendix
Intuitions from the symmetric model carry over to the asymmetric extension. In
particular, political viability of CU is promoted by the fact that cross–border profit
externalities are internalised under CU; this benefits lobbies, in particular when α
is large and hence the external tariff is high. However, member social welfare is
still promoted by the CU: the tariff on the non–produced good is inefficiently low,
and by “trading protection”, the countries achieve a welfare improvement. As long
as trade with the rest of the world does not cease in either product, the member
welfare improvement in fact dominates the inefficiency brought by excessively high
political tariffs under CU.
6. Conclusion
Customs unions have rapidly proliferated in recent decades. We demonstrate
that this important observation remains frequently unnoticed when regional trade
agreements are assessed based on their sheer number. We provide new insights
by demonstrating both the spread and increase in CU membership across several
continents by looking at the bilateral country pairs and an agreement type they
chose for trade. Further, we researched and identified the customs unions with
the implemented common external tariff and traced the membership growth over
the recent decades. Motivating our suggestion of the success of the CUs, we show
that over the years that many weaker agreements (partial scope agreements and
free trade agreements) were often maturing into a customs union. Some of them,
39
such as the numerous FTAs among eastern EU members, presenting an impressive
increase in the number of FTAs, were signed specifically with a goal to be later
turned into the European Union CU.
These empirical facts on the silent success of the customs unions are supported
by theory. We extend a common model used in the regional integration literature to
include all types of bilateral trade agreements, generalise the competitive structure
to have more than one firm in each country, consider symmetric and asymmetric
production structures and allow for a politically motivated government. We show
that customs unions dominate all other bilateral agreements, including those not
permitted under GATT XXIV due to violation of the zero internal tariff require-
ment, from a political objective perspective. This dominance is driven by improved
management of cross–border elasticities as well as greater scope for protection of
profits, especially important when governments are subject to lobbying pressures.
But we also show that CUs improve the social welfare of member states, so long
as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely. Thus, customs unions
can be an engine for development for member countries.
These results highlight the importance of customs unions to our understanding
of preferential trade and its consequences. In particular, the static gains from
FTAs to third countries – due to tariff complementarity – may not last long if
FTAs then turn into CUs. On the other hand, CUs can bring welfare benefits to
member countries, and may lead to a reduction in trade costs that could not be
achieved under FTA.
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Appendix
6.1. Market Outcomes
The problem of any of the n firms in, say, country i is given by
max
{qii,qji,qki}
= P (Qi, qii)qii + (P (Qj , qji)− tji)qji (9)
+ (P (Qk, qki)− tki)qki
where Qj denotes the total quantity produced in the market by all other firms, and Qj
denotes the market output.
And similarly for firms in the other countries, j and k. To find the equilibrium in country j,
sum the 3n first–order conditions for qii, qij , qik respectively to find the equilibrium output for
given tariffs:
0 = 3n(Γ−Qx)−Qx − ntji − ntjk
Q∗j (tji, tjk) =
3nΓ− n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
P (Q∗j (tji, tjk = Γ−Q∗j (tji, tjk) =
Γ + n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
and, again, symmetrically for the other countries. The output of the representative firm in
each country is then given by
q∗jj =
Γ + n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
(10)
q∗ji =
Γ− (1− 2n)tji + ntjk
3n+ 1
(11)
q∗jk =
Γ + ntji − (1 + 2n)tjk
3n+ 1
(12)
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6.2. Welfare Components objective given the market outcomes
CSi(tji, tjk) = (Γ− P (Q∗j (tji, tjk))Q∗j (tji, tik)−
Q∗i (tji, tjk)
2
2
(13)
=
Q∗j (tji, tjk)
2
2
=
3nΓ− n(tji + tjk)2
2(3n+ 1)2
TRi(tjk, tjk) = n(q
∗
jitji + q
∗
jktjk) (14)
=
Γ(tjk + tji) + 2ntjitjk − (2n+ 1)(t2jk + t2ji)
3n+ 1
Πii(tji, t) = n(pi
∗
ii + pi
∗
ji + pi
∗
ki) = n((q
∗
ii)
2 + (q∗ji)
2 + (q∗ki)
2) (15)
Now, in each trade regime these become:
a) MFN, tij = tik = t
ΠMFNi = Π
MFN
ii + Π
MFN
ji =
n(Γ + 2nt)2
(3n+ 1)2
+
n(Γ− (1 + n)t)2
(3n+ 1)2
CSMFNi =
(3Γn− 2nt)2
2(3n+ 1)
2
TRMFNi =
2ntMFN ((−n− 1)t+ Γ)
3n+ 1
GMFNi = CS
MFN + TRMFN + (1 + α)ΠMFNi )
b) FTA or CU, tij = 0, tij = t
ΠCUi = Π
CU
ii + Π
CU
ji =
2n(Γ + nt)2
(3n+ 1)2
ΠCUii = Π
CU
ji =
(nt+ Γ)
2
(3n+ 1)
2
CSCSi =
(3Γn− nt)2
2(3n+ 1)
2
TRCUi =
ntCU ((−2n− 1)t+ Γ)
3n+ 1
GCUi =
2(α+ 1)n(nt+ Γ)
2
(3n+ 1)
2 +
(3Γn− nt)2
2(3n+ 1)
2 +
nt((−2n− 1)t+ Γ)
3n+ 1
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6.3. Welfare Components given the Market Outcomes and Government Tariff Pol-
icy
At t = tMFN
GMFNi = CS
MFN
i + TR
MFN
i + (1 + α)(Π
MFN
ii + Π
MFN
ji )
GMFNi =
Γ2n2((2α− 1)n− 2)2
2(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2 +
Γ2n(1− 2αn)(2αn+ 2n+ 1)
2(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2
+ (1 + α)n
Γ2(n+ 1)2
(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2 + (1 + α)n
Γ2(1− 2αn)2
4(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2
GMFNi =
Γ2n(2αn− n− 2α− 3)
2(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2) +
(α+ 1)Γ2n(2αn− 1)2
4(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2
ΠMFNki =
Γ2(2αn− 1)2
4(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2
At t = tCU
GCUi = CS
CU
i + TR
CU
i + (1 + α)(Π
CU
ii + Π
CU
ji )
GCUi =
Γ2n2(4αn− 8n− 5)2
2(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)2 +
Γ2n(1− 4αn)(4αn+ 4n+ 1)
(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)2
+ (1 + α)2n
4Γ2(2n+ 1)
2
(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)2
GCUi =
Γ2n(4αn− 8n− 8α− 9)
2(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)
ΠCUki = n
Γ2(4αn− 1)2
(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)2
6.4. Example:Welfare components under MFN and CU
To illustrate how different trade-offs and distortions play out depending on the competitive-
ness level and government bias, consider the following example that looks at the extremes. First,
the case of the monopoly firms in each country and, second, the case of 10 firms in each country.
For each case we also look at the extremes of the political motivations: benevolent case and the
political bias that would lead to autarky of the customs union.
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Table 2: Example: Welfare components under MFN and CU
n=1 n=10
α = 0 α = 0.25 α = 0 α = 0.025
Total Profits
PSMFNi 0.17Γ
2 0.20Γ2 0.07Γ2 0.076Γ2
PSCUi 0.199Γ
2 0.28Γ2 0.04Γ2 0.045Γ2
Home Profits
PSMFNii 0.16Γ
2 0.198Γ2 0.007Γ2 0.008Γ2
PSCUii 0.099Γ
2 0.111Γ2 0.002Γ2 0.002Γ2
Partner Profits
PSMFNji 0.01Γ
2 0.03Γ2 0.000Γ2 0.000Γ2
PSCUji 0.099Γ
2 0.111Γ2 0.002Γ2 0.002Γ2
Consumer Surplus
CSMFN 0.18Γ2 0.154Γ2 0.4196Γ2 0.4165Γ2
CSCU 0.234Γ2 0.222Γ2 0.454Γ2 0.454Γ2
Tariff Revenue
TRMFN 0.06Γ2 0.043Γ2 0.001Γ2 0.003Γ2
TRCU 0.014Γ2 0 0.001Γ2 0
Gov-t Payoff
GMFN 0.41Γ2 0.448Γ2 0.496Γ2 0.498Γ2
GCU 0.447Γ2 0.5Γ2 0.499Γ2 0.5Γ2
6.5. Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1. External Tariffs: Customs Union vs FTA
1. A free trade agreement imposes a strictly lower external tariff than a Customs Union,
tFTAik < t
CU
ik
2. The stronger the political bias, the more CU external tariff exceeds FTA
Proof. i. Under FTA, policy solves the first order condition of problem 4
dGi
dtFTAik
=
dCSi(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAik
+
dTRi(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAik
+ (1 + α)
dΠii(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAik
= 0 (16)
Under a CU, the first order condition of problem 3 is given by
dGi
dtik
=
dCSi(ti)
dtik
+
dTRi(ti)
dtik
+ (1 + α)(
dΠii(ti)
dtik
+
dΠji(ti)
dtik
) = 0 (17)
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Evaluating the latter condition at the FTA tariff yields
dGi
dtik
|tik=tFTAik = 0 + (1 + α)
dΠji(ti)
dtik
> 0 (18)
Note that whenever the bias is not too high and the tariff is not prohibitive and we
have interior solution, the objective of the government must be concave (second-order
polynomial). Due to the concavity of Gi(t), the tariff that solves the CU problem must
be higher than the FTA level.
ii. Using the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions 16 and 17,
dtFTAik
dα
=
d(
dGi(t
FTA
i )
dtik
)/dα
d(
dGi(t
FTA
i
)
dtik
)/dtik
= −dΠii(t
FTA
i )/dt
FTA
ik
SOCFTA
Similarly,
dtCUik
dα
= −dΠii(t
CUi)/dtiz + dΠji(t
CUi)/dt
CU
i
SOCCU
Note that it is always the case that SOCCU > SOCFTA as SOCCU > SOCFTA +
d2Πji/dt
2
ik and, hence, −SOCFTA > −SOCCU > 0, the latter inequality comes due to
concavity. Combining,
d(tCUik − tFTAik )
dα
> − (dΠii(t
CU
i )− dΠii)/dtik(tFTAi )) + dΠji(tCUi )
SOCCU
= −dΠji(t
CU
i )
SOCCU
> 0 (19)
as Πji(t
CU
i ) ≥ 0, since the denominator is negative by concavity of the government objec-
tive Gi(t), the overall product is positive.
Lemma 2. External Tariffs: Customs Union vs MFN
i. Under MFN, the external tariff is strictly higher than under Customs Union: tMFNik > t
CU
ik
ii. The stronger the political bias, the more the MFN tariff exceeds the CU external tariff
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Proof. i. The government’s first order condition under MFN is
dGi
dtMFNik
=
dCSi(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNik
+
dTRi(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNik
+ (1 + α)
dΠii(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNik
= 0 (20)
Substituting into the FOC of a customs union, 17, we obtain after some algebra
dGi
dtik
|CUt=tMFN =
n2(8α2n2 + α(16n2 − 6n− 4) + 8n2 − 1)
2(n+ 1)2((1− 2α)n2 + 3n+ 1) < 0 (21)
Similarly to the previous case, whenever the solution is interior, Gi(t) is concave in tariffs,
the external tariff in CU must be lower than in MFN.
ii. Using the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions 20 and 17,
dtMFNik
dα
= − Πii(t
MFN
i )
d2Gi(t
MFN
i )/dt
MFN
ik
dtCUik
dα
= −Πii(t
CU
i ) + Πji(t
CU
i )
d2Gi(t
CU
i )/dt
CU
ik
Substituting the required expressions,
dtMFNi
dα
− dt
CU
dα
=
4n(Γ + 2ntMFN )
2(1 + n)2 + (1− 2αn)2n −
4n(Γ + ntCU )
2(1 + 2n)2 + (1− 4nα)n > 0
Both the nominator and denominator are positive as tMFN > tCU and α < 1/4n
Lemma 3. For any n > 1 and any level government bias, firms prefer MFN over other
trade regimes. In case of monopolies, n = 1, the firms prefer customs union.
Proof. First, let us determine the comparative statics of profits in each regime. Let us look at
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the change of the profits with with respect to the government bias and number of firms.
dpi
dα
=
dq2
dα
= 2q
dq
dt
dt
dα
=>
In case of the MFN:
dpiMFNii
dα
= 2qMFNii
qMFNii
dt
dtMFNi
dα
Similarly, for CU:
dpiCUi
dα
=
dpiCUii
dα
+
dpiCUji
dα
= 2
dpiCUii
dα
= 2 ∗ 2qCUii
qCUii
dt
dtCUi
dα
qMFNii
dt =
2n
3n+1 and
qCUii
dt =
n
3n+1 (see Market Outcomes in Appendix).
Additionally,
qMFNii
dt >
qCUii
dt and
dtMFNi
dα >
dtCUi
dα by Lemma 2
It follows then
dpiMFNii
dα
= 2qMFNii
2n
3n+ 1
dtMFNi
dα
> 2(qCUii
n
3n+ 1
dtCUi
dα
) =
dpiCUi
dα
dpi
dn
=
dq2
dn
= 2q
dq
dn
=>
In case of the MFN:
dpiMFNii
dn
= −2qMFNii
3Γ− 2tMFN
(3n+ 1)2
Similarly, for CU:
dpiCUi
dn
=
dpiCUii
dn
+
dpiCUji
dn
= 2
dpiCUii
dn
= 2(2qCUii
dqCUii
dn
) = −4qCUii
3Γ− tCU
(3n+ 1)2
It follows then
dpiMFNii
dn
= −2qMFNii
3Γ− 2tMFN
(3n+ 1)2
> −4qCUii
3Γ− tCU
(3n+ 1)2
=
dpiCUi
dn
,
as 2qCUii > q
MFN
ii and 3Γ− tCU > 3Γ− 2tMFN > 0 (see Market Outcomes).
Next, let us show the claim that for n = 1 the profits in CU are higher than in MFN. We will do
this for the highest possible bias of the government that leaves the CU members without trade
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with the rest of the world. This case is sufficient as, by comparative statics, it will be true for
lower values of the bias: α = 1/(4n)
piMFNii + pi
MFN
ji =
Γ2(n+ 1)2
(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2 +
Γ2(2αn− 1)2
4(n(1− 2αn) + (1 + n)2)2 =
65Γ2
36 ∗ 9
piCUii + pi
CU
ji = 2
4Γ2(2n+ 1)
2
(n(1− 4αn) + 2(1 + 2n)2)2 =
2Γ2
9
So profits in CU are higher when n = 1 as 2 > 65/36 Finally, let us show that at n = 2 the MFN
profits are higher under MFN
6.6. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: First, consider the problem of maximising the government objective of
country i, subject only to tariffs being non–negative, i.e.
max
tij≥0
tik≥0
Gi(t) = max
tij≥0
tik≥0
CSi(t) + TR(t) + (1 + α)(Πii(t) + Πji(t)) (22)
= max
tij≥0
tik≥0
Q2i (t)
2
+ nqi(t)t
T + (1 + α)nq2ii(t) + (1 + α)nq
2
ji(t)
Remark: In any solution, t∗ij ≤ t∗ik. Indeed, assume the opposite were true, and there was a
solution where t∗ik < t
∗
ij . That implies Gi(t
∗
ij , t
∗
ik) ≥ Gi(t∗ik, t∗ij). GHi (t) = CSi(t) + TR(t) + (1 +
α)Πii(t) is a symmetric polynomial in (tij , tik) and thus has the same value for permutations.
However (1+α)Πji(t) is decreasing in tij and increasing in tik and thus Πji(t
∗
ij , t
∗
ik) < Πji(t
∗
ik, t
∗
ij)
as t∗ik < t
∗
ij . It follows that Gi(t
∗
ij , t
∗
ik) < Gi(t
∗
ik, t
∗
ij) - contradiction to the assumption that
(t∗ij , t
∗
ik) was a solution.
Now, suppose first first were an interior solution with no constraint binding. By the first
order conditions:
t∗ij = − (2α+1)Γn+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)
t∗ik = − Γα(2(α+1)n+1)n+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)
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Testing the second order condition: For a maximum, the function should be concave. This
requires | H |> 0 and H(1, 1) > 0, where H =
n−2n2−n+2α(5n2+4n+1)(3n+1)2 n2 4n+1−2α(n+1)(3n+1)2
n2 4n+1−2α(n+1)(3n+1)2 n
−8n2−9n−2+4αn2
(3n+1)2
 is
the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives.
The | H |= n+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)(3n+1)2
It follows that n+α(2n2α− 4n2− 5n− 2) > 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
concavity of the function and the local extremum being the global maximum.
However the extremum is outside of the feasible set wherever the function is concave, the
internal tariff found with the FOC tij < 0.
Wherever the function is concave, i.e. n+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2) > 0, the function is monotone
and decreasing on the right of the extremum and, hence, the constraint on non-negative tariffs
is binding. The Remark implies then that tij = 0 and tik ≥ 0. The problem thus converges to
that of the customs union.
When the function is not concave, i.e. n + α(2n2α − 4n2 − 5n − 2) ≤ 0, the borders of the
feasible set and the prohibitive tariffs have to be considered. The Remark implies that either
t∗ij = 0 or t∗ik = tik is true in any solution.
Thus we are comparing the candidates of the form (t∗ij , t∗ik) = (0, tik) to the candidates of
the form (t∗ij , t∗ik) = (tij , tik).
Remember that G(0, tik) is concave and maximised at (t∗ij , t∗ik) = (0, tCUik ) for α ≤ 1/(4n)
Moreover, the function
G(tij , tik) =
(Γ2n− tij)2
2(2n+ 1)2
− ntij(Γ− n(1 + tij))
2n+ 1
+
(1 + α)n(Γ + ntij)
2
(2n+ 1)2
+
(1 + α)n+ (Γ− n(1 + tij))2
(2n+ 1)2
is concave if the second order derivative
∂2G(tij,tik)
∂t2ij
= n−n+α(4n
2+4n+2)
(2n+1)2
Thus wherever α < n4n2+4n+2 , the function is concave and the extremum is found at:
tij =
(2α+ 1)Γ
−n+ α(4n2 + 4n+ 2)
As the extremal point is negative when the function is concave, the function is maximized
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at tij = 0 and the candidates of the form (tij , tik) collapse to (0, tik). And we know that for any
α ≤ 1/(4n) (0, tCUik ) is the solution of the function G(0, tik).
Instead, if α ≥ n4n2+4n+2 , the function G(tij , tik) is not concave. Thus the function reaches
its highest point at either tij = 0 or tij = tij .
G(0, tik) =
2Γ2n(n+α+1)
(2n+1)2
G(tij , tik) =
Γ2n(n+2α+2)
2(n+1)2
G(0, tik)−G(tij , tik) = Γ
2n(3n+2+2α(1−2n2))
2(n+1)2(2n+1)2 > 0 for α ≤ 1/(4n) Thus, G(tij , tik) < G(0, tik) <
G(0, tCU ).
Proof of Proposition 6:
i. The problem in the MFN for good a is, as before,
tMFNi,a = argmax
ti,a
Gi(t)
s.t. tik,a = til,a
while in the FTA the problem for good a is
tFTAi,a = argmax
ti,a
Gi(t)
s.t. tik,a = 0
However as there are no firms producing good a in the partner country the change in the
constraint from tik,a = til,a in MFN to tik,a = 0 in FTA has no impact on the government
objective - in both cases the government only sets the tariff til,a.
tCU = argmax
ti,tj
Gi(t) +Gj(t)
s.t. tij = 0, tji = 0, tik = tjk
CSi,a + TRi,a + Πii,a +CSj,a + TRj,a + Πij,a because Πii,a = Πij,a and CSi,a + TRi,a =
CSj,a + TRj,a by construction
the CU problem is equivalent to CSi,a + TRi,a + Πii,a which is the MFN problem.
ii. The tariff on the only-import good in MFN and FTA is determined by the consumer sur-
plus and tariff revenue considerations. The arguments behind the tariff complementarity
make the comparison straightforward.
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The increase in the tariff paid by the rest of the world in the CU compared to the other
two trade regimes is presented in part i. It follows that once the country has to match
the tariff level to the partner level where the producer interests are being protected, its
tariff would be higher than when no producer interests are involved. Indeed, following
a similar approach to the symmetric case in derivations, the customs union tariff of the
welfare maximising government is:
tCU,b =
Γ(2n+ 1)
2n2 + 5n+ 2
Meanwhile the MFN tariff in the good that the country does not produce does not depend
on the political bias and is:
tMFN,b =
Γ
2(n+ 1)
It follows that the difference between CU and MFN tariff is positive when α = 0, a
difference that will only grow as α increases:
Γn
2(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
> 0
Proof of Proposition 7:
i. The consumer surplus and tariff revenue in the only-import good in the CU and in the
FTA has the following form:
CSi,b + TRi,b =
(2Γn− ntik,b)2
2(2n+ 1)2
+
ntik,b(Γ(−n− 1)tik,b)
2n+ 1
While the profits in the partner country have the following form:
Πij,a = n
(ntjk,a + Γ)
2
(2n+ 1)2
Note that as the countries are a mirror image of each other, tik,b = tjk,a
The comparison of the government payoffs in each trade agreement regime leads to the
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following outcome:
G∗CUi −G∗FTAi =
8(α+ 1)2Γ2n3(n+ 1)2
(4n2 + 5n+ 2)2(2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
for all α < 1/(2n)
G∗CUi −G∗MFNi =
Γ2n(2α2n2 + 4αn2 + 2n2 + 7αn+ 5n+ 6α+ 4)
4(n+ 1)2(2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
ii. The difference in social welfare between CU and FTA is given by:
W ∗CUi −W ∗FTAi =
8(α+ 1)Γ2n3(n+ 1)2(2n2 + 5n+ 2− 6αn2 − 5αn− 2α)
(4n2 + 5n+ 2)2(2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2)2 > 0
as at α = 1/(2n)
W ∗CUi −W ∗FTAi =
Γ2n(2n+ 1)(4n3 + 4n2 − n− 2)
2(n+ 1)2(4n2 + 5n+ 2)2
> 0
for all α < 1/(2n)
W ∗CUi −W ∗MFNi =
Γ2n(2α2n2 + 4αn2 + 2n2 + 7αn+ 5n+ 6α+ 4)
4(n+ 1)2(2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
The welfare advantage of the CU over the MFN follows from the welfare advantage of
FTA over MFN.
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Table 3: Countries Implementing a CU Common External Tariff, by Year
Andean Community
1992 -
2012 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
1992
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana
Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago,
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
2012
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana
Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and Grenadines
East African Community (EAC)
1992 -
2012 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda
Eurasian Customs Union
1992 -
2012 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
European Union Customs Union
1992
Andorra, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, San Marino, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal
2012
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Monaco, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
1992 -
2012 United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
MERCOSUR
1992 -
2012 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela
Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)
1992 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa
2012 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa
Central American Common Market (CACM)
1992 -
2012 Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica
ECOWAS
1992 -
2012 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo - WAEMU members
Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
Switzerland-Liechtenstein
1992 Liechtenstein, Switzerland
2012 Liechtenstein, Switzerland
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